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Abstract
Women often respond less favorably to competition than men. In this paper, we test for the
e↵ects of social norms on willingness to compete. Subjects compete in two-person teams. In
the treatment, one team member is randomly assigned the role of “breadwinner”, and the other
person is randomly assigned as the “supporter”. There are no real di↵erences between the
roles in our experiment, except for the framing. These two roles have opposite social norms
for competitiveness, reminiscent of gender roles in western society. In the baseline, subjects
compete in two-person teams without role assignment. We find women’s willingness to compete
significantly increases when they are assigned as breadwinners compared to women in the base-
line or female supporters. We also find that there is no gender gap in willingness to compete
between female breadwinners and males in the baseline. The increase in willingness to compete
is mainly contributed by high-ability women. Males are also a↵ected by the role assignment;
male supporters are less likely to enter the tournament than male breadwinners. We argue that
the changes in willingness to compete are mainly driven by the social norms implied by the two
roles.
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“By a peculiar weakness of human nature, people generally think too much about the opinion
which others form of them.” Arthur Schopenhauer1
I Introduction
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) first documented large gender di↵erences in competition entry in
a controlled laboratory setting using two di↵erent payment schemes: piece rate or tournament.
Following Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), laboratory and field experiments largely confirm this
finding (for a review see Niederle and Vesterlund (2011)). Economists are increasingly interested
in investigating whether such gender di↵erences in competitiveness may be useful for explaining
persistent labor market di↵erences. If women are reluctant to compete, then they may also be less
likely to seek job promotions or choose more lucrative and competitive fields (Ibarra et al., 2010).
Selecting out of certain labor markets is costly for society, especially when competent women are
reluctant to compete for positions for which they are the best suited candidate.
In order to understand why the gender gap in competition entry persists, prior experimental
research focuses on three aspects: beliefs, risk attitudes and other-regarding preferences. First,
while men are typically more confident than women, this only explains part of the gender gap.
After controlling for beliefs, a significant gender di↵erence still remains (e.g. Balafoutas and Sutter
(2010); Niederle and Vesterlund (2010); Shurchkov (2012). Second, women are more risk averse than
men (Eckel and Grossman, 2008). However, gender di↵erences in risk attitudes do not contribute to
gender di↵erences in tournament entry (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Große and Riener, 2010).
Third, there is little evidence that other-regarding preferences play a big role in explaining the
gender gap (e.g. Dreber and Johannesson (2008); Bartling et al. (2009); Dohmen and Falk (2011)).
Even after simultaneously controlling for all three factors, a significant gender gap in tournament
entry still persists (Kamas and Preston, 2010; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011).
In this paper we ask whether social identity or social norms play an important role in individual’s
willingness to compete (hereafter, WTC). Akerlof and Kranton (2000) introduced identity concepts
from psychology and sociology into economic behavior. They pose that identity is a sense of
belonging to a social category, and it prescribes how people within a category should behave. One
1Schopenhauer, A., Saunders, T.B. and Bax, E.B., 1901. The Wisdom of Life: And Other Essays. Washington,
Dunne.
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important application of the social identity model is gender, where man and woman constitute
two separate social categories. More importantly, man and woman are associated with di↵erent
behavioral prescriptions. For example, “men should not do domestic work at home and men should
earn more money than their wives.”2 Social identity can influence economic outcomes because
deviating from socially prescribed behavior generates a social cost. In psychology, this social cost
is known as the “Backlash e↵ect”. Rudman (1998) defines backlash e↵ects as social and economic
reprisals for behaving counter-stereotypically. In this paper, we argue that one reason why women
are less competitive is due to prescribed social expectations or social norms. Specifically, women
are expected to conform to a supporting wife role and to maternal duties. Men, on the other hand,
are expected to compete in the workplace (Blackstone, 2003; Oakley, 2016). Deviating from the
established social norms or misaligning with prescriptive stereotypes results in social costs. For
example, Bertrand et al. (2015) show that marriage satisfaction is lower in households where the
wife’s income exceeds the husband’s income; in fact, if this is the case, couples are more likely to
divorce.3 Fisman et al. (2006) show that men in the dating market prefer women who are less
professionally ambitious. Men also tend to avoid highly educated female partners (Brown and
Lewis, 2004; Greitemeyer, 2007; Hitsch et al., 2010). Job promotions increase the likelihood of
divorce for women, but not for men (Folke et al., 2016). Bursztyn et al. (2017) argue that social
identity costs make single female students demonstrate less ambition in the presence of single males.
Although men are also subject to gender-role constraints, the prescriptions of female stereotypes are
particularly problematic for women in competitive environments. As noted in the role incongruity
theory, men’s social roles promote competitiveness, while women’s roles penalize it (Eagly and
Karau, 2002).
A direct way to close the gender gap in competition is to find ways to encourage women to
compete, especially women with high abilities. In previous research, one approach is to assume
preferences for competition are malleable. In this regard, Gneezy et al. (2009) find that the gen-
der gap in tournament entry reverses in a matrilineal society compared to patriarchal societies.
Single-sex education has been proposed as an alternative to increase the competitiveness of women
(Fryer Jr and Levitt, 2010). Booth and Nolen (2009) find that girls in selective single-sex schools
2Hochschild and Machung (2012) suggest these prescriptions exist within many households.
3Cochard et al. (2018) uses a lab experiment with couples who live together and suggests that there are no
di↵erences in preference for work-division in couples.
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are more likely to enter competitions against boys than girls from mixed-sex schools. Another ap-
proach is to take the gender gap in competitiveness as given and to implement institutional changes
designed to encourage women to enter competitive environments. Institutional changes previously
studied in the literature include changing the gender composition of competitions (Niederle et al.,
2013; Sutter and Ru¨tzler, 2010; Datta Gupta et al., 2013), and changing the competitors (Große
and Riener, 2010; Apicella et al., 2017), developing a sponsorship program of competition entry
(Baldiga and Co↵man, 2016), among others.
We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate competitiveness by changing the institution.
Specifically, by randomly assigning di↵erent roles or titles, we assign each individual a di↵erent
social norm for competitiveness than the socially prescribed gender norm. To study how social
norms impact WTC, we set up a competition in pairs instead of individual competitions. We
introduce in our design WTC scales (0-5) instead of a binary choice for entering the competition.4
In the treatment, before subjects proceed to choose their WTC level, we exogenously and randomly
assign the role of “breadwinner” or “supporter” to each group member. The control has no such
role assignment, and subjects directly choose their WTC. The two roles in the treatment were
selected based on traditional gender roles in western society. The labels used to describe the roles
—“breadwinner” and “supporter”— were selected based on the results of surveys within the same
study population.5 There are no real di↵erences between the two roles in terms of payment, power,
responsibility and so on, except for the framing. The two selected roles (framing) have opposite
social norms for competitiveness, analogous to gender roles in competitiveness for men and women.
We expect these two roles to reduce or raise the social cost of entering the competition, and
subsequently, we also expect the WTC of men and women to change depending on their randomly
assigned roles.
Consistent with previous literature, our results show that the gender gap in WTC exists in the
control group; however there is no gender di↵erence in WTC in the treatment. When women are
randomly assigned as breadwinners, their WTC significantly increases compared to women in the
baseline or women who are randomly assigned as supporters. More interestingly, the gender gap
4This design gives us more information about decision makers’ preferences for competition entry, and we compare
it to binary choices in the results section.
5Before the experiment, we conducted a survey with over 1800 responses to ask respondents to select corresponding
labels to the primary-earner and the secondary-earner in a household. The details of the procedure are explained in
the following section.
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between treated female breadwinners and males in the control completely disappears. The increase
in women’s willingness to compete is mainly contributed by high-ability women. Men are also
a↵ected by the exogenous role assignment; male supporters are less likely to enter the competition
compared to male breadwinners. By examining the mechanisms behind our results, we demonstrate
that the role assignment does not change subjects’ confidence or performance. Instead, by eliciting
social norms for competitiveness for each role and gender, we argue that the changes in WTC are
mainly driven by the social norms for competitiveness associated with the two randomly assigned
treatment roles.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to study the e↵ects of social norms on the
gender gap in tournament entry by exogenously and directly inducing distinctive social norms to
each gender in the lab, and the first to use WTC scales instead of a binary choice for competition
entry. Dargnies (2011) studies the impacts of social identity on WTC, but she focuses on building
group identity during the experiment and testing its e↵ects on WTC. The rest of paper is organized
as follows. In section II, we explain how the two social norm roles were selected. Section III shows
our theoretical hypotheses. In section IV, we present the experimental design and procedures. The
analysis and results are presented in section V. Section VI examines the mechanisms behind the
results, and section VII concludes.
II Selecting the Social Norm Labels
In order to test for the e↵ects of social norms on WTC, we exogenously change the social norms
associated with competitiveness socially prescribed to each gender by randomly assigning subjects
two di↵erent titles/roles. The two roles have opposite social norms for competitiveness.
In order to elicit social norm labels pertinent to our subject population, we conducted two
rounds of surveys. First, a total of 56 undergraduate students were recruited to provide open-ended
social norm labels corresponding to primary and secondary earners in a household. Specifically,
the scripts asked:
In one word, how would you call someone who is the primary earner in a household:
In one word, how would you call someone who is the secondary earner in a household:
From these 112 responses, the three most frequently used labels for each role were selected for
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the second survey. The second survey consisted of the same two questions using a multiple choice
format with the top three labels for each role in the first survey. For the primary earner, the top
there labels were Breadwinner, Primary, Provider. For the secondary earner, the top three labels
were Supporter, Secondary, and Assistant. A total of 3,794 responses were collected in the second
survey with 1,897 responses to each question. The results show that 42% of respondents chose
“breadwinner” for the primary earner label, and 55% chose “supporter” for the secondary earner
label. Thus, the most popular labels from the two surveys “breadwinner” and “supporter” were
selected as the labels for our social norms treatment. Under the social identity theory, a man is
supposed to be the breadwinner of his family, while a woman is supposed to be the supporter (Eagly
and Kite, 1987). We are interested in documenting how women/men change their competitive
behavior when they are assigned the role of breadwinner or supporter.
III Theoretical Framework
In this section we discuss our main hypothesis based on the social image model in Bursztyn and
Jensen (2017). Bursztyn and Jensen (2017) assume that if an individual i’s utility depends on the
posterior expectations held by others in a reference group j after they observe her behavior, then
she has social image concerns. Let us assume that an individual i can choose one of two types of
visible actions ai 2 {0, 1}, and each action reveals information about i’s type  i 2 {l, h}. Type h
(“high” type) is more socially desirable than type l (“low” type) in reference group j which has n
individuals in total. The social image term Sij in an individual i’s utility function is:
Sij =  ijEi(!j)Pn i( i = h|ai) (1)
where Pn i( i = h|ai) represents the probability that other individuals (n   i) in the reference
group j treat i as a type h after observing i’s choice of action, ai. !j represents the views of social
desirability held in group j, and !j > 0 when an individual is seen as type h by group j. The term
Ei(!j) corresponds to i’s expectation about the social desirability of being observed by group j as
type h. Finally,  ij measures how much individual i cares about the group expectation concerning
type h on her. If i does not care about her image or what others think about her type, then  ij = 0.
Thus, we assume for any non-zero  ij , individual i cares about her social image in group j and is
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therefore subject to social pressure. If  ij > 0, then individual i is a conformist, and in contrast
 ij < 0 means i is a contrarian.
To consider the empirical implications of social image, Bursztyn and Jensen (2017) further
embed the social image term Sij above within a random utility model. Assume there is a latent
variable a˜i capturing the social desirability of action ai. For example, a˜i may represent the social
desirability of entering the competition, negotiating a promotion or speaking in public. The com-
plete utility function consists of a social image component, as well as some benefits (Bi) and costs
(Ci). Bi and Ci are independent with image concerns, and vary by individuals.
a˜i = Bi   Ci +  ijEi(!j)Pn i( i = h|ai) + ✏i (2)
where ✏i is a random error. To sum up, the social image term in an individual’s utility is determined
by: Pn i( i = h|ai) which represents the likelihood of others in group j to perceive i as type h
after observing her action ai; how socially desirable being of type h is to the reference group j, !j ;
individual i’s expectation about the social desirability of her choice action, Ei(!j); and how much
the individual cares about her image or type perceived by the inference group,  ij . We test the
social image concerns through this utility function form.
In our experiment, the action, ai, is “entering the tournament” or not, ai 2 {0, 1}. Based
on the traditional role of each gender, entering the tournament for women is more likely to be
perceived as low type l, and it is socially undesirable. This means Pn i( i = h|ai) decreases and
!j < 0 if a woman chooses to enter the competition. However, men have the opposite gender role
which results in high type h, higher Pn i( i = h|ai) and positive !j if a man chooses to compete.
Therefore, based on equation (2), entering the tournament generates higher social cost for women,
thus lowering their utility, but it increases men’s utility.
The two exogenously assigned social norm roles of “breadwinner” and “supporter” also have
opposite social norms for competitiveness. It is socially desirable for a breadwinner to enter the
competition, but it is socially undesirable for a supporter to enter competitions. By assigning the
two roles to each gender, we expect the role of “breadwinner” to reduce women’s social cost of
entering the competition and therefore increase their willingness to compete. In particular, for a
female breadwinner, entering a competition should result in !j > 0 and a higher Pn i( i = h|ai).
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Similarly, the title of supporter is expected to increase the social cost of entering the competition
for men and reduce their willingness to compete.
IV Experimental Design
We conducted a between subject design with a baseline control and a treatment group. Our
experiment has two stages. The baseline and treatment group only di↵er in the second stage. The
experiment was conducted at Texas A&M University, and subjects were students who were native
English speakers recruited by bulk email. A total of 28 sessions were conducted with eight subjects
per session. Nine subjects experienced technical issues that a↵ected their performance in the first
stage and their subsequent choice in the second stage, and hence they were excluded from the
analysis. Ten subjects were not native English speakers and may have experienced di culties in
understanding their assigned roles, so they were also excluded.6 The final sample consists of 205
subjects.
First Stage: In the first stage, subjects arrived to the experiment and they were seated in
rows. Each session had 8 subjects. Following the original design in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007),
subjects had five minutes to individually solve a real e↵ort task under a noncompetitive piece-rate
payment scheme. The real e↵ort task consists of adding-up five two-digit numbers. Participants
were not allowed to use a calculator, but they could use scratch paper. Participants received 10
cents for each correctly solved problem. Contrary to the original design in Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007), we do not reveal the subjects’ performance in this stage until the end of the experiment.
Since our focus is on the e↵ects of social norms on WTC, we try to avoid potential confounding
e↵ects of natural ability on competition entry decisions. The purpose of the first stage is to control
for ability without any group or competition context.
Second Stage: After the first stage, each participant was randomly paired with another
participant in the same room. We use team competition instead of individual competition so that
we can assign di↵erent group roles which contain di↵erent social norms of competitiveness to each
group member. In order to identify the e↵ects of social norms, the partner assignment was blind,
6Although in the recruitment process, being a native English Speaker was required, there were still some partici-
pants who were not native English speakers who registered for the experiment. In order to have exactly 8 participants
in each session, we allowed some non-native English speakers to participate.
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and no information about partners was disclosed. Four groups were formed in each session.
In the second stage, each subject had 5 minutes to solve a task similar to the first stage. Before
they proceed to the task, participants can choose between two possible payment schemes for their
group: piece rate and tournament. In the piece rate scheme, each group receives 20 cents for each
correctly answered question.7 In the tournament scheme, each group receives 80 cents for each
correct answer only if they win, otherwise they receive nothing.8 If a group enters the tournament,
then they compete with all the other three groups in the session, regardless of the payment scheme
chosen by the other groups. This design feature ensures equivalent expected payments for the two
payment schemes, and removes potential concerns of participants competing only against those
who may have also chosen the tournament scheme.
For the decision to compete, each group member is asked to select the payment scheme for his
group using a six point scale: {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, which is our willingness to compete measure. Table
1 shows the probability of entering the tournament based on the WTC scale, which is revealed to all
subjects. Individuals can choose the piece rate payment scheme by selecting 0 or the tournament by
selecting 5. One of the two group members’ WTC was randomly selected as the binding WTC for
the group. This design feature helps us to eliminate strategic considerations. The WTC selection
is anonymous between the two group members, and participants do not know the payment scheme
for their groups or their performance in this stage until the end of the experiment.
After selecting the payment scheme, each group proceeds to the second round real e↵ort addition
task. Subjects worked separately on the task and then the payment of each group is determined by
the combination of the number of correct answers of the two group members. The group earnings
were equally divided between the two members. This design feature keeps subjects performance
consistent and excludes the possibility of individuals competing on the basis of team performance.
Treatment Interventions: The di↵erence between the treatment and the control group is
the randomly assigned role to each group member in the second stage. For the treatment group
in the second stage, each group member received the following information before answering the
7The expected payment under the piece rate payment scheme between the first and second stage is the same.
8In related literature, the usual payment for each correct answer is 50 cents. In our case, if we choose 50 cents in
the first stage, then the payment for each correct answer would be $4 under the tournament payment scheme in the
second stage. It has been shown that scaling up payments results in a significant increase in risk aversion (Holt and
Laury, 2002, 2005), and this impact might be heterogeneous by gender. To reduce the e↵ects of the payment itself
on competition entry, we lower our payment for the piece rate scheme to 10 cents in the first stage and 20 cents in
the second stage.
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Table 1: Willingness to Compete Scale
Willingness to compete scale Probability to enter the competition
0 0%
1 20%
2 40%
3 60%
4 80%
5 100%
WTC scale question:
You were randomly selected to be the Breadwinner (Supporter) of the group, and your partner
is the Supporter (Breadwinner) of the group.
In the control group, there is no such role assignment. As previously mentioned, in order to
eliminate other factors that may a↵ect competition entry, we inform subjects that the roles are
randomly assigned. Recall that the group payment is equally divided, and one of the two members’
WTC is randomly selected as the binding WTC for the group. Given all these design features, the
only di↵erence between the two group members is the role framing. As such, we can identify the
e↵ects of the social norms implied by the role assignment.
Other-Other Allocation: After the second stage, we conducted a hypothetical other-other
allocation. Half of the subjects in the treatment were told that they could hypothetically use money
from the experimenter ($3) to allocate between the group members who entered the tournament
but did not win (i.e., subjects with $0 earnings in the second stage). Subjects can distribute their
allocation in the following way (the sum of the two allocations must equal $3):
Group member: breadwinner, freshman year, economics major.
I allocate $ to this student;
Group member: supporter, senior year, engineer major.
I allocate $ to this student.
The other half of the subjects in the treatment and all the subjects in the control received the
same information, except for the descriptions of the group members, in which we focus on gender
instead of the assigned role:
Group member: female, freshman year, economics major.
I allocate $ to this student;
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Group member: male, senior year, engineer major.
I allocate $ to this student.
To avoid experimenter demand e↵ects, in addition to gender and assigned roles, we also included
irrelevant information, including academic majors and educational levels as shown above. The
irrelevant information was randomly assigned and balanced.
Social Norms Belief Elicitation: We follow Krupka and Weber (2013) to elicit social atti-
tudes toward the competitiveness of each role in our experiment. Using a five-point-scale, subjects
were asked to indicate how competitive they believe the following individual should be: a female
supporter, a female breadwinner, a woman, a breadwinner, a male supporter, a supporter, a man,
and a male breadwinner. The social attitudes task was incentivized. If the participant’s answer was
the same as the most frequent answer in the session, they received a reward of ¢25. The elicited
social norms help to explain how they a↵ect individual WTC. This is further discussed in section
VI.
Performance Beliefs and Risk Preferences: Finally, we elicit participants’ beliefs about
their relative performance in the first task. We ask participants to guess whether they performed
better than their second-stage partner. We also ask them to state their beliefs about their overall
ranking in the session (1-8). Correct answers were incentivized with a ¢25 reward. The performance
beliefs can be used to examine whether changes in WTC induced by the role assignment are derived
from changes in confidence arising from the roles.
At the end of the experiment, all participants were asked to complete a risk gamble-choice task
following Eckel and Grossman (2008) and a demographic survey. The experiment was computer-
ized using Ztree (Fischbacher, 2007), and had a duration of approximate 30 minutes. Participants
received payments from the two tasks and the incentivized questions. Table 2 summarizes the ex-
perimental procedures and the number of subjects in each experimental condition. The instructions,
questionnaires and surveys are available in the Appendix.
Table 2: Summary of Treatments and Number of Subjects.
First stage Second stage Female Male F-Breadwinner M-Breadwinner Total
(individually) (group, WTC)
Baseline Group Piece rate No roles 41 35 — — 76
Treatment Group Piece rate Role assignment 73 56 38 26 129
Notes: The required sample size of breadwinner is 21 for female, and 12 for male based on power calculation.
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V Results
In this section, we first examine whether conditional on ability, men and women di↵er in their
preferences for performing under a piece-rate versus a tournament scheme when competing in teams.
We then examine whether di↵erent role assignments change their preferences for competition.
V.1 Willingness to Compete in the Baseline
In our experiment, the WTC was elicited in the second stage. Instead of a Yes or No binary choice,
participants were asked to indicate their WTC in a 0-5 scale. Figure 1 shows the mean WTC
by gender in the baseline. Using a two-tailed Mann-Whitney U -Test, we find that the WTC of
males is significantly higher than females (p = 0.037). Recall that, in the baseline, there is no
role assignment. Participants have no information about their partners, except that the partner is
another participant in the room.9 We always keep the same number of participants in each session
(8). Our result suggests that in the absence of specific social norm roles, men are more likely to
choose a competitive tournament environment than women when competing in teams. Throughout
the paper the reported test statistics refers to a two-tailed Mann-Whitney U -Test, unless otherwise
noted.
Figure 1: Mean of WTC in the Baseline (with confidence intervals bars)
9Gender composition of each session is observed by participants, and it is controlled in the following model
estimations.
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Previous literature using team competitions instead of individual competitions have explored
gender di↵erences in tournament entry. Dargnies (2009) finds no gender gap in team competition
entry. Healy and Pate (2011) find competing in two-person teams reduces the gender gap by
two-thirds. Note that both papers use a binary decision to elicit preferences for competition. In
the baseline, if we evaluate WTC = 0 and WTC 6= 0 instead of our actual WTC scale level
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, then there is no gender gap in tournament entry (p = 0.723). This result replicates
the findings of Dargnies (2009). According to the corresponding tournament entry probability of
each scale number, we further recoded the WTC scales with 0  2 corresponding to “No” and 3  5
corresponding to “Yes” in the binary choice. The intuition behind this alternative definition of
competition entry is that the probability to enter the competition for subjects who chose 0-2 is
0%-40% (below 50%). Alternatively subjects with a 3-5 scale had a probability to compete of 60%-
100% (above 50%). We find that the di↵erence in WTC between man and women is marginally
significant (p = 0.059). The results from previous studies and our results recoded to a binary
decision suggest that using a binary decision alleviates to a certain degree the gender gap in group
competition entry.
Figure 2 shows that the proportion of men who choose WTC = 0 is slightly higher than women
(although not significant); however, for subjects with a WTC 6= 0, there is a mass concentration
for men in the 4   5 scale. For women, there is a concentration in WTC in the 1   3 range. We
argue that our setting of using a scale to measure the level of WTC reveals people’s preferences
for competition in more detail. Outside of the laboratory, people can take di↵erent degrees of
actions between 0 to 1 for competitions. For example, employees can negotiate for a promotion
with di↵erent degrees of aggressiveness.
V.2 Gender Di↵erences in Performance in the Baseline
In order to rule out individual ability as a driver of WTC, subjects were not informed about their
performance in the first stage until the end of the experiment. However, subjects may still form
beliefs about their performance before choosing to enter the tournament or not. In the second stage,
participants work in teams. Recall that participants do not know the payment scheme applied to
their group until the end of the experiment. However, they can speculate about the payment
scheme based on their own WTC, especially those withWTC > 0. Performance anticipation under
12
(a) non-cumulative (b) cumulative
Figure 2: Proportions of WTC Scale Choice by Gender
a group context and a tournament environment may also a↵ect subjects’ decisions. Therefore,
we examine whether gender di↵erences in performance (ability) exist under the piece rate and
tournament payment schemes in the baseline.
Table 3 summarizes the performance of men and women. In the first stage, the average number
of correctly solved problems was 9.05 for women and 9.83 for men. The p-values in the last row show
that gender di↵erences in performance are not statistically significant. In the second stage, we first
show the performance of all participants in order to evaluate whether the group context generates
gender di↵erences in performance. The di↵erence in performance under the group context is not
significant, which is consistent with Healy and Pate (2011). On average, women correctly solve 9.34
problems, and men 9.40 (p-value = 0.896). Next, we compare the performance of individuals who
actually entered the tournament. The di↵erence is still not significant (p-value = 0.823). Previous
literature (e.g., Gneezy et al. (2003)) documents that competitions can boost performance; however
using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, we do not find di↵erences in performance between the first and
second stage for men or women (see p-values in the last column). This result is reasonable in our
case, since performance and payment scheme information was not revealed until the end of the
experiment. Given the similarity in performance of men and women, we argue that in the baseline,
men have higher WTC than women of similar abilities. Several regression estimations and other
potential underlying mechanisms will be explained later.
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Table 3: Gender Di↵erence in Performance in the Baseline
First Stage Second Stage Second Stage p-value
(all participants) (only those entering comp)
Men 9.83 9.4 9.08 0.215
Women 9.05 9.34 9.12 0.176
p-value 0.322 0.896 0.832
V.3 The Impact of Random Role Assignment for the Treatment Group
In this section, we explore how the social norm role assignment impacts participants’ WTC. Recall
that in the treatment group, before choosing their WTC in the 0-5 scale, subjects were informed
that they were randomly selected as the “breadwinner” (or “supporter”) of the group. We also
informed participants that their partner was assigned the alternative role. Figure 3 shows that
the gender gap in WTC decreases by 56% in the treatment group and it is no longer statistically
significant (p-value = 0.123). We further analyze whether di↵erent roles have asymmetric e↵ects
by gender.
First, we compare the WTC of each role to the baseline. Figure 3 shows that the WTC of
treated female breadwinners significantly increased compared to women in the baseline (p-value =
0.031). More interestingly, there is no di↵erence in the WTC between treated female breadwinners
and untreated men in the baseline (p-value = 0.373). This means that when women are randomly
selected as the “breadwinner” of the group and men have no role assignment, the gender gap in
WTC disappears. The WTC of treated male “breadwinners” is not statistically di↵erent than
untreated men in the baseline (p-value = 0.285). We then compare the WTC of treated supporters
to the baseline. There are no di↵erences for both genders (p-value = 0.933 for women, p-value =
0.181 for men). Although the di↵erence in WTC between male supporters and men in the baseline
is not significant, the decrease in male supporters’ WTC closes the gender gap in WTC between
male supporters and females in the baseline (p-value = 0.436).
We further compare the WTC within the role assignment (breadwinner vs supporter). Figure
3 suggests that for both genders, breadwinners’ WTC is significantly higher than the WTC of sup-
porters (p-value = 0.049 for women, p-value = 0.016 for men). When we compare the WTC of each
role across gender, we find that there is no gender gap in WTC between males and female “support-
ers” (p-value = 0.513); however male breadwinners are more willing to enter the competition than
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Figure 3: Comparisons of Mean of WTC (with confidence intervals bars)
female breadwinners (p-value = 0.032). There is no di↵erence in WTC between female breadwin-
ners and male supporters (p-value = 0.233). Female breadwinner’s WTC is actually higher than
male supporter’s WTC. Male breadwinner’s WTC is statistically higher than female supporter’s
WTC (p-value = 0.002).
Table 4 summarizes performance in the treatment and it shows that the results are similar to
the baseline results presented in section V.2. The p-values in the last row indicate that there are
no gender di↵erences in performance in the first and second stage. Using Wilcoxon signed-rank
tests, we evaluate the performance between the first and second stage for each role and gender, and
the p-values are shown in the last two columns. The results suggest that the role assignment does
not change the performance for men or women.10 This result suggests that the changes in WTC
induced by the treatment (role assignment) are not likely due to changes in performance induced
by the roles.
Table 4: Gender Di↵erence in Performance in the Treatment Group
First Stage Second Stage Breadwinner Supporter P-value P-value
(individual) (group) (Breadwinner) (Supporter )
Men 9.80 9.46 8.5 10.3 0.497 0.811
Women 8.86 8.97 9.32 8.6 0.286 0.441
P-value 0.202 0.163
10Overall, the changes in performance between the first and second stage are not significant (p-value = 0.740 for
women, p-value = 0.553 for men).
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We estimate ordered probit models for the control and treatment groups. The dependent
variable is WTC. The number of correct answers in the first stage is used to control for ability (1st
Stage). We also control for confidence, risk preferences and the gender composition of each session.
Confidence is indicated by the relative performance beliefs of participants. Risk preferences are
indicated by the choice of Eckel and Grossman (2008) incentivized risk gamble task, which has 6
choices (1-6). A higher number means more risk-tolerant behavior (Risk). Gender composition
indicates the number of women in each session (No. Female). Table 5 suggests that in the baseline,
risk aversion contributes to explain the gender gap in WTC. Risk-tolerant participants are more
willing to compete in the baseline. In columns (3) and (4), we pool all data in the treatment,
including men and women breadwinners and supporters. First, consistent with figure 3, there are no
significant e↵ects for gender. The positive and significant breadwinner coe cient shown in column
(4) suggests that the “breadwinner” label makes people more willing to enter the competition
compared to the “supporter” label. Columns (5) to (8) display the regression results for women
and men in the treatment separately. Compared to “supporters”, “breadwinners” have a positive
and significant e↵ect on both women’s and men’s WTC. The male results shown in column (8)
suggests that the increase in men’s WTC can be explained by their confidence and risk preferences.
Furthermore, by focusing only on the comparison between breadwinners and untreated participants
in the baseline (columns 9-12), we find that the “breadwinner” label has a larger (and significant)
e↵ect on the WTC of females. These results are robust to the inclusion of several control variables.
Compared to untreated men in the baseline, there are no significant e↵ects on the WTC of male
“breadwinners”. These results are all in line with the conclusions derived from Figure 3.
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 6, we estimate an ordered probit model to investigate the gender
gap in WTC between female breadwinners and males in the baseline. The dependent variable is
WTC. Columns (3) and (4) present the results for male “supporters” and untreated females in the
baseline. The results show that there are no gender e↵ects on the WTC across all the estimations.
This result suggests that the gender gap in WTC disappears when comparing female breadwinners
and males with no role assignment; or when comparing male supporters and females with no role
assignment.
We also estimate di↵erence-in-di↵erence models to investigate whether the same role has asym-
metrical e↵ects on the WTC of men and women. The results are shown in Table 7. All the
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Table 6: Ordered Probit Estimations of Gender Gap in WTC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FBread & MBase FBread & MBase MSupporter & FBase MSupporter & FBase
Female -0.173 0.083 -0.206 -0.370
(0.260) (0.326) (0.252) (0.261)
1st Stage 0.046 -0.049
(0.042) (0.033)
Confidence 0.476 0.322
(0.365) (0.315)
Risk 0.012 0.323⇤⇤⇤
(0.078) (0.086)
No. Female -0.189 0.050
(0.147) (0.101)
Observation 73 73 71 71
R-square 0.002 0.032 0.003 0.074
Notes: Dependent variable is WTC. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 1st Stage refers to performance in the 1st
stage. Confidence refers to a dummy that takes on the value 1 for subjects who believed that they performed better than
their partners. NO. female refers to the number of female in each session. ⇤p < 0.10, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01
regression specifications control for ability, confidence, risk preferences and gender composition of
the group. In column (1), we exclude the data of “supporter”, and the dummy variable treatment
takes the value of 1 if the treatment assignment is breadwinner and 0 for the baseline. In column
(2), the “breadwinner” data is excluded, and treatment is 1 if the role is supporter and 0 for the
baseline. In column (3), we only use the data of treatment group, and treatment is 1 if the role
is breadwinner and it is 0 if the role is supporter. The coe cients for “Treatment” suggest that
for males, there is no di↵erence in the WTC between the assigned roles and the baseline, but male
breadwinners’ WTC is higher than the WTC of male supporters (shown in column 3). The coe -
cients for “Female” indicate that in the baseline, females’ WTC is lower than males’ WTC, however
there is no di↵erence in WTC between female supporters and male supporters. These results are
consistent with the conclusions derived from Figure 3. The interaction terms show that there is no
di↵erential e↵ect of assigned roles across gender.
To sum up, we have the following findings:
(1) Compared to the baseline, there is a big increase in women’s WTC when they are randomly
assigned as breadwinners. This increase is large enough to close the gender gap in WTC between
female breadwinners and untreated males in the baseline. There is no di↵erence in the WTC
between female supporters and untreated females in the baseline.
(2) Compared to the baseline, there is no change in the WTC of male breadwinners or male
18
Table 7: OLS Regressions for the Di↵erence-in-Di↵erence Estimates of WTC.
(1) (2) (3)
Breadwinner & Base Supporter & Base Breadwinner & Supporter
Treatment 0.527 -0.345 0.775⇤
(0.467) (0.458) (0.436)
Female  0.747⇤  0.777⇤ -0.200
(0.440) (0.449) (0.404)
Treated * Female 0.303 0.725 -0.356
(0.584) (0.576) (0.558)
Constant 1.633⇤ 1.412 0.791
(0.854) (0.870) (0.819)
Observation 140 141 129
R-square 0.156 0.153 0.202
Notes: Dependent variable is WTC. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions control for
ability, confidence, risk and gender composition.
supporters.
(3) When comparing within the social norm treatment (i.e., breadwinners and supporters),
supporters are less likely to enter the tournament compared to breadwinners for both males and fe-
males. The decrease in the WTC of male supporters closes the gender gap between male supporters
and untreated females in the baseline.
VI Exploring the Mechanisms Behind the Changes in WTC in
the Social Norm Treatment
In this section, we explore the potential mechanisms behind the results presented above. We first
ask whether the title of “breadwinner” increases the confidence of women or change their risk
aversion. We then test for the e↵ects of social norms. Next, we separate women based on their
performance in order to explore the role of performance in explaining the changes in WTC when
women are assigned as “breadwinners”.
VI.1 Changes in Confidence and Risk Aversion
Recall that in the belief elicitation stage, we asked subjects to guess whether they believe they
solved more questions correctly than their partner during the first stage. We also asked subjects
to guess their performance rank (1-8) in the first stage. Both questions were incentivized.
Table 8 shows the proportion of subjects who believe they performed better than their partners
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Table 8: Proportion of subjects who believe they performed better than their partner (confidence)
Baseline Breadwinner Supporter p-value p-value p-value
Base vs BW Base vs SP Base vs SP
Men 80.0% 73.1% 83.3% 0.528 0.732 0.355
Women 78.1% 78.9% 71.4% 0.923 0.509 0.460
P-Value 0.836 0.589 0.260
in the first stage. Although it has been documented in the literature that women are less confident
than men (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), the p-values in the last row show there is no gender
di↵erence in confidence within the blind group context of our experiment.11 The p-values in the
last three columns suggest no di↵erences in the confidence between the roles by gender. The beliefs
for guessing the rank show similar results. We further investigate whether confidence e↵ects on the
WTC change by the role assignment using a di↵erence-in-di↵erence approach. We regress WTC
on a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there is a role assignment and 0 for the baseline.
The results are shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 9. The interaction terms are not significant,
which confirms our result that social norm role assignment did not change the e↵ects of confidence
on WTC.
Risk preferences were measured using the Eckel and Grossman (2008) gamble choice task.
We replicate the robust findings in the literature that women are more risk averse than men
(p   value < 0.01). We further investigate whether risk changes by the role assignment using a
OLS approach, and the results are presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 9. The results are
similar to the confidence results. There are no significant interaction terms, suggesting that risk
aversion has no di↵erential impacts on the WTC of di↵erent groups. We conclude that the changes
in WTC are not likely driven by changes in confidence or risk aversion.
VI.2 The E↵ects of Social Norms
We follow Krupka and Weber (2013) to elicit social norms for the competitiveness of each role and
gender. Participants were asked to:
11There are several di↵erences of the belief elicitation question between Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and our
experiment. They asked the subjects to guess their relative performance in the tournament (i.e., to their competitors),
but we ask the relative performance to partners; they asked subjects to guess the rank (1-4), but our questions is a
“Yes” or “No” question.
20
Table 9: OSL Estimates of Confidence and Risk on WTC.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Breadwinner & Base Supporter & Base Breadwinner & Base Supporter & Base
Treatment 0.871 0.481 1.202 0.649
(0.689) (0.565) (0.788) (0.761)
Confidence 0.745 0.874⇤
(0.523) (0.515)
Treat * Confidence -0.222 -0.577
(0.740) (0.683)
Risk 0.258⇤⇤ 0.271⇤⇤
(0.124) (0.128)
Treat * Risk -0.125 -0.202
(0.168) (0.194)
Constant 1.420 1.074 1.280 1.610⇤
(0.883) (0.898) (0.880) (0.872)
Observation 140 141 140 141
R-square 0.155 0.148 0.158 0.151
Notes: Dependent variable is WTC. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions control for gender, risk/confidence,
performance in the first stage and gender composition in each session.
“Please indicate in a 1-5 scale how competitive you think a should be. If your answer is
the same as the most frequent answer in the experiment, you will receive a payment of 25 cents.”
The social norms were elicited for the following: woman, female supporter, female breadwinner,
breadwinner, man, male supporter, supporter, and male breadwinner in a household. Figure 4
shows the mean responses for the social norms of each role and gender in the treatment group.12
Using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, we find that most participants believe females should be less
competitive than males (p-value= 0.052). The social norms for the competitiveness of “Supporters”
are lower than “Breadwinners” (p   value < 0.01). Adding the two labels to the gender closes
the gender gap of social norms for competitiveness (p-value = 0.470 for Breadwinner, p-value =
0.132 for Supporter). We further find that the social norms for competitiveness of both female
and male supporters are lower than females and males without any labels (p   value < 0.01 for
both genders). In contrast, most subjects believe that the competitiveness of female and male
breadwinners should be higher than men and women without labels (p   value < 0.01 for both
gender). Interestingly, the results are consistent when considering the social norms reported by
12In the control group, subjects had not seen the two labels until this section, and some subjects commented that
they did not understand the label “Supporter” until they saw “Breadwinner” in the following question. Thus, we
focus on the elicitation of social norms in the treatment. Including the social norms elicited in the control does not
change the results (see Figure A1).
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men and women separately (see Figure A2). From these results, we conclude that the role of
“supporter” decreases the social desirability for entering into competition. This means that the
social cost of entering the competition is higher for a supporter, regardless of whether the supporter
is a man or a woman. However, breadwinners —male or female— have a social norm expectation
to be competitive. This question captures Ei(!j) in the theoretical model, which corresponds to
i’s expectation about the social desirability of being observed by group j as a high type h. These
results are aligned with our main hypothesis described in the theoretical framework. The social
cost of entering the competition for a female breadwinner is lower than that of a woman.
Figure 4: Elicited Social Norms for Competitiveness in Treatment
Recall that after the second stage, subjects were asked to do other-other allocations (using the
experimenter’s money) to participants who entered the competition, but lost the competition and
received $0 payments. Both females and males allocate more to females (Wilcoxon signed-rank
tests, p-value = 0.033 for women, p-value = 0.051 for men).13 Participants allocate more money to
supporters compared to breadwinners, but the di↵erence is not significant (see Figure A3, A4).14
To some extent, the allocation results in our experiment suggest that women and supporters have
a similar status in competition as perceived by all the participants.
13Our results are in line with the dictator games literature which find women tend to receive more money as
recipients (Engel, 2011).
14Previous literature shows a tendency to distribute more to poor recipients in dictator games (e.g., Eckel et al.
(2005); Bran˜as-Garza (2006)).
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VI.3 WTC by Performance
The purpose of our research is to evaluate whether women, particularly women with high ability,
can be encouraged to become more competitive. In this section, we explore the WTC of women
by performance. In particular, we are interested in the linkage between the increase in WTC and
performance. If the increase in WTC is driven by high-ability women, then the results of our
experiment have important policy implications for social e ciency.
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(d) Male (supporter and baseline)
Figure 5: WTC by Performance Quantiles
Figure 5 shows the mean WTC for women (panels a and b) and man (panels c and d) conditional
on their performance quartile during the first stage.15 Panel a of Figure 5 shows the results for
the baseline and female breadwinners. The graph shows that the increase in WTC of female
breadwinners is mainly contributed by high-performing women. The di↵erence in WTC between
the baseline and female breadwinners in the first two best quantiles (3&4) is significant (p-value =
15We use performance in the first stage since there is no group pairing e↵ect in the first stage, hence, the perfor-
mance in the first stage is the performance before participants make the tournament entry decision.
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0.040). In panel b of Figure 5, we compare the WTC by performance of women in the baseline and
women supporters. As expected we do not find similar patterns of changes in WTC by performance
quantiles in this case. We also show the WTC by performance quantile for males (see Figure 5-c
& 5-d). We do not find similar results for male breadwinners, but we find that the WTC of male
supporters in the top two performance-quantile is lower than males in the baseline within the same
quantiles (p-value = 0.048). This means the decrease in WTC of male supporters is also mainly
contributed by high-performing men.
VII Concluding Remarks
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) recently surveyed over 3,600 professional women (aged 28-40) to
find out about their career development experiences and aspirations.16 The results of the survey
show that 82% of women are confident in their ability to fulfill their career aspirations and 73% are
actively seeking career advancement opportunities. However, 42% feel nervous about how starting
a family might impact their careers. A↵ected by traditional social norms, women are expected to
spend more time in child care and household activities, and hence 38% of surveyed women saw
motherhood and flexibility as a penalty on their careers. As a result, reducing the limits of social
norms for competitiveness on women becomes important. Especially for high-ability women, since
it is costly for themselves, their families and society if they don’t pursue professional positions for
which they are the best suited candidate. PwC’s global chairman Bob Moritz states “It must go
hand in hand with e↵orts to mitigate any unconscious biases and gender stereotypes that have
traditionally impacted career success and progression in workplaces around the world”.
However, gender stereotypes remain extremely powerful because they are evoked by highly
visible, biological characteristics and they are deeply rooted in culture. Changing stereotypes is
almost impossible during a short period of time, but other social norms for females can be promoted
to mitigate the e↵ects of traditional gender stereotypes and change their behavior. We use a
simple experiment and provide evidence that females’ willingness to compete is limited by social
norms. We show females’ WTC significantly increases when they are randomly assigned the role of
“breadwinners”. Although the role is randomly assigned, and there is no real responsibility or power
16PricewaterhouseCoopers (doing business as PwC) is one of the Big Four auditors in the world.
The report of the survey can be found at www.pwc.com/timetotalk.
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bestowed on this role, it still gives women a “nudge” to surpass the limits of traditional gender roles
in competition entry. This result is further reinforced by examinations of the underlying mechanism
behind the results: we do not find changes in subjects’ confidence or performance. Becoming the
“breadwinner” reduces the social cost or backlash e↵ects of entering the competition for women.
According to our social norm elicitation, under the title of “breadwinner”, it is socially desirable for
women to enter the competition. The role assignment also a↵ects males. When men are randomly
assigned as the “supporter”, their WTC decreases.
Importantly, the increase in female breadwinners’ WTC is mainly contributed by high-ability
women. This means that relaxing social norm constraints encourage women with high ability to
enter the competition. Our random role assignment improves e ciency in terms of improving the
match of ability and competition entry. Interestingly, at the end of the experiment, we ask subjects
which role they prefer, breadwinner or supporter, and we found men and women both prefer to be
breadwinners. The e↵ects of the role nudge in our experiment imply that restructuring institutions,
such that assigning leadership encouraging titles to women, have the potential to reduce gender
disparities in economic and labor market outcomes.
In our experiment, for simplicity and clean identification, we do not disclose any information
about partners. Future work may investigate how subjects change their WTC when the gender
of the other group member (role) is disclosed to them, or when the role is assigned based on
performance. It is also possible that social norms may have heterogeneous e↵ects on women of
di↵erent ages and women in di↵erent cultures, which can be another venue for future work.
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Appendix.
A1.Instructions
WELCOME
In the experiment today, you will be asked to complete two di↵erent tasks. None of these will
take more than 5 minutes. At the end of the experiment we will pay you based on your performance
in these two tasks. The method we use to determine your earnings varies across tasks. Before each
task we will describe in detail how your payment is determined.
Your total earnings from the experiment are the sum of your payment from the two tasks.
New page:
Task 1
For Task 1 you will be asked to solve a set of problems independently. You will be given 5
minutes to answer these problems. For calculation questions, you cannot use a calculator, however
you are welcome to write the numbers down and make use of the provided scratch paper. Your
answers to the problems are anonymous.
You get 10 cents per problem you solve correctly. Your payment does not decrease if you provide
an incorrect answer to a problem. We refer to this payment as the piece rate payment. You will
not be informed of how many questions you correctly solve and your corresponding payment in this
task until the end of the experiment.
Please do not talk with one another for the duration of the experiment. If you have any
questions, please raise your hand.
New page:
Task 2
For task 2 you will be randomly paired with a partner (one of the participants in this room, but
you will not be told who she/he is), and you two will work as a group anonymously. Four groups
in total will be formed in this section. As in Task 1 each group will be given 5 minutes to solve
a similar set of problems. The sum of answers that the two members correctly solve will be the
final number of correct answers of the group. The final payment of each group in this task will be
equally split between the two group members.
New page:
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Your payment in this task will also depend on your choice of payment scheme: piece rate or
tournament. If you choose piece rate, your group will be paid in the same way as Task 1, but with
20 cents per problem you solve correctly.
If you choose tournament, your group will be paid based on the performance of your group
relative to that of the other three groups, regardless the payment scheme chosen by the other
groups. For instance, if the number of problems solved correctly in your group is the largest among
all the four groups, your group will receive 80 cents per correct answer, four times the payment
from the piece rate; otherwise your group will receive no payment for this task. If there are ties,
all these winner groups will receive 80 cents per correct answer.
The choice and answers that you and your partner made will keep anonymous. You will not be
informed of the corresponding payment of your group in this task until the end of the experiment.
New page:
Now, you were randomly selected to be the BreadWinner of your group, and your partner is
the Supporter. (only for treatment)
Please indicate in 5-scale how much you want to choose the tournament payment scheme for
your group. Your partner will also be asked this same question.
Your and your partner’s choices will be randomly selected to be the final choice of your group.
You (your partner) will not know the choice made by your partner (you) in this task. You will
be informed of the final payment scheme of your group and your corresponding payment in this
task at the end of the experiment.
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New page:
Please indicate in 5-scale how much you want to choose the tournament payment scheme for
your group. If you choose scale 1, and your choice is selected as your group’s choice, then the
probability of entering the tournament will be 20% (i.e., 80% of probability to use piece rate); if
you choose scale 2, the probability of entering the tournament will be 40%. Scale 5 means entering
tournament for sure.
Scale Description
0 Piece rate
1 Entering the Tournament with probability 20%.
2 Entering the Tournament with probability 40%.
3 Entering the Tournament with probability 60%.
4 Entering the Tournament with probability 80%.
5 Entering the Tournament for sure.
Your choice is:
New page:
In this stage, if the experimenter has 3 dollars, and now you can use this $3 (not your money) to
allocate money to the group members who enter the tournament but did not win the competition
(i.e., receive nothing in the above stage).
The sum of your allocations to the two group members must be equal to $3.
New page:
Please indicate in the five-scale how competitive do you think a woman should be if she is
the supporter in her household? If your answer is the same as the most frequent answer for this
question in today’s experiment, then you will get extra 25 cents.
New page:
Do you think that your performance in Task 1 is better than your partner? If your guess is
correct, then you will get extra 25 cents.
Yes
No
New page:
Please estimate the rank of your performance relative to the rest of the participants in Task 1?
For example, if you check 1, you consider yourself as better than all other seven participants. If
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your guess is the same as your rank, then you will get extra 25 cents.
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
New page:
If you were given $100 and had an opportunity to invest in a risky asset which has a 50% chance
of earning 2.5 times of your investment and 50% of earning zero, how much of the $100 will you
invest?
New page:
If you can choose your role in a household, what is your option?
Breadwinner
Supporter
New page:
Please make a choice among the following six gamble choices. Each choice has two events A
and B, and each event’s chance of occurring is 50%. After you make your choice, the system will
randomly choose an event for that choice, you will get the corresponding payo↵ for that event.
Please select the gamble that you choose.
New page:
Do you think men or women generally do better in the ”math problem” task that you just did?
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Demographic survey
Please answer the following survey questions.
(1) Please enter your age in years.
(2) Please indicate the HIGHEST level of education you have completed.
Some High School or less
High School Diploma
Some College
2 year/Associates Degree
4 year/Bachelor’s Degree
Some Graduate School
Graduate Degree
(3) Including yourself, how many people live in your household?
(4) Please indicate your gender.
Male
Female
(5) Please indicate your race.
Asian/ Pacific Islander
African American
Caucasian/ White
Native American/ Indigenous
Hispanic
Other (Please list below)
(6) Please indicate your household yearly income for 2016. (Include all forms of income, in-
cluding salary, interest and dividend payments, tips, scholarship support, student loans, parental
support, and allowance)
Less than $30,000
$30,000 - $39,999
$40,000 - $49,999
$50,000 - $59,999
$60,000 - $69,999
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$70,000 - $79,999
$80,000 - $89,999
$90,000 - $99,999
$100,000 - $149,999
$150,000 or more
(7) Your major?
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Word Selection Survey
Survey1
In one word, how would you call someone who is the primary earner in a household:
In one word, how would you call someone who is the secondary earner in a household:
Survey 2
1. In one word, how would you call someone who is the primary earner in a household:
Breadwinner
Primary
Provider
Other (please list)
2. In one word, how would you call someone who is the secondary earner in a household:
Secondary
Supporter
Assistant
Other (please list)
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Elicited Social Norms
Figure A1: Elicited Social Norms for Competitiveness (including baseline & treatment group)
(a) Female (b) Male
Figure A2: Elicited Social Norms for Competitiveness by Gender
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Average Allocations
Figure A3: Average Allocations to Each Gender from Both Men and Women
Figure A4: Average Allocations to Each Role from Both Men and Women
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